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1 Introduction
In recent years, South–South development
cooperation has come to the fore. This coincides
with the global economic recession and the
growing focus on Africa as a favourable source of
raw materials, but also as a new frontier for
financial investments and investments in large-
scale agriculture. There is a sharp divide in
perceptions of the expansion of investment in
Africa by emergent powers. Detractors argue
that emergent nations are pursuing a strategy of
placing commercial interests above policy reform
and good governance in a framework of market
liberalisation. This is countered by arguments
that the investments of BRICS countries (Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa) create
new diversified opportunities based on
symmetric relations or ‘soft power’ rather than
coercion rooted in the vestiges of colonial rule. 
Like African nations, the emerging powers have
also gone through processes of economic reform
rooted in market liberalism during the 1980s and
1990s that have permeated and transformed
their economies. This article examines how such
neoliberal reforms mediate and influence the
relationships between emergent powers and
African nations. It investigates the impact of
South–South relations on the nature of
development and technical cooperation, aid, and
investment, and on the configuration of relations
between states, farmers and the private sector. It
then examines the extent to which the experiences
of China and Brazil in developing their agriculture
result in qualitatively new paradigms for
agricultural development, and whether they
create new openings for a redefinition of
development policy and practice. Moreover, the
article assesses whether South–South
development cooperation merely reinforces the
drive to capital accumulation unleashed by global
economic liberalisation, and so reflects strategies
by emergent powers to acquire new markets for
agricultural technology, inputs, services and new
sources of raw materials. In conclusion, the article
questions the extent to which alternative
paradigms can be created within the institutional
framework created by neoliberal reform.
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2 Nurturing a dominant paradigm: the role of
the USA
Advocates of South–South cooperation tend to
present it as distinct from previous development
paradigms, suggesting that it carries no baggage
from a colonial past and involves nations which
have collectively experienced and struggled
against colonial domination. However, the
dominant paradigms of agricultural development
in Africa are not just based on the heritage of
colonialism. A major, perhaps underestimated,
influence lies in initiatives led by the USA in the
late 1940s and 1950s to create new paradigms for
development outside of colonial structures and
within the constructs of free markets. The
framework for this was Point Four of the Truman
declaration, the inaugural speech given by
President Truman on 20 January 1949. In this
address, Point Three was an overt military
strategy, a call for a collective defence
arrangement to counter the rise of communism,
which gave birth to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). Point Four, on the other
hand, was based on an effort to spread American
influence through the transfer of technology and
Western democratic ideals:
More than half the people of the world are
living in conditions approaching misery. Their
poverty is a handicap and a threat both to
them and to more prosperous areas… The
United States is preeminent among the
nations in the development of industrial and
scientific techniques… I believe that we should
make available to peace-loving peoples the
benefits of our store of technical knowledge in
order to help them realize their aspirations for
a better life. And in cooperation with the other
nations, we shall foster capital investment in
areas needing development… The old
imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit –
has no place in our plans. What we envisage is
a program of democratic fair dealing…
Greater production is the key to prosperity and
peace. And the key to greater production is a
wider and more vigorous application of
modern scientific and technical knowledge.
(Truman 1949)
During the 1950s and early 1960s, the USA built
a programme of technical cooperation, which was
delivered through the International
Development Advisory Board (which later
evolved into the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID)) and
through the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations
(Perkins 1997; Arnove 1982). These three
organisations were highly instrumental in
organising an international institutional
framework for agricultural research to contain
the three perceived threats of famine,
overpopulation and communism. The work of
these three agencies resulted in the building of
new scientific and technical institutions within
African countries, the education of an epistemic
community of African scientists and technicians
ingrained with Western liberal values, and the
creation of new international agricultural
research structures that expanded plant
breeding and agricultural technology innovations
developed within the USA for wider application
throughout the developing world. This formed
the institutional infrastructure for the creation
of the CGIAR (Consultative Group for
International Agricultural Research) system and
the architecture through which the Green
Revolution was initiated.
Within African countries, new technical and
research institutions were funded and
international agricultural research facilities such
as IITA (the International Institute for Tropical
Agriculture, established with headquarters in
Nigeria as part of the CGIAR) were created to
support adaptive research within national
institutions and create new directions for
agricultural research. Through these initiatives
new technical and research institutions came
into being and were shaped on the basis of US
institutions and institutional values. 
Under colonial rule, the creation of an African
scientific and technical cadre had been given low
priority. Indeed, it was not until the 1950s that
the colonial authorities began to build a network
of national agricultural research and
experimentation stations and hire expatriate
scientific and technical staff (Hodge 2007). As a
consequence, African nations attained national
sovereignty with a very rudimentary agricultural
research infrastructure that was seriously
understaffed. 
The building of technical capacity involved
overseas training programmes. The USA provided
programmes and scholarships for Africans to gain
technical, scientific and social science education
within US institutions. Through these training
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programmes the USA was able to build influence
within the evolving development institutions
within developing countries. Assessing these
developments, Papanek (1969: 183) comments:
As a result of progress towards a professional
consensus, foreign economists working in
many less developed countries have
immediate and national allies in their
national colleagues, who share their
professional language and often their goals.
The differences between foreign and national
economists are disappearing. The universities’
future training, research and institutional
involvement in the less developed world needs
to take this development into account. 
Gouldner (1982) argues that the overseas
training programmes co-opted leaders of
developing countries into an ‘international
occupation of experts and technicians who
constitute a specific status group with status
interests they wish to protect and advance’
(Gouldner quoted in Arnove 1982: 318). These
programmes were initiated alongside
programmes of learning about doing
development, which also drew the social sciences
into international development, including rural
sociology, and anthropology. 
This led to the development of African Studies
and Development Studies departments in
American universities. More practical learning-
by-doing programmes also involved the Peace
Corps Volunteers. In addition, open learning was
complemented with covert learning, with US
university researchers in Africa and Peace Corps
volunteers providing lucrative potential for
espionage in the context of the Cold War
(Stockwell 1984).
The US foundations supported the creation of
networks to build the leadership capacities of
African researchers and experts to recognise,
understand and solve development problems.
They fostered linkages between an intelligentsia
across national borders within Africa with
intellectuals within the USA. They created a
series of mutually supporting linkages among
national organisations to meet national
development objectives. The US foundations
tended to define and shape the research and
development objectives of these networks to
foster US interests rather than utilise them to
open up new areas of research and
understanding outside of US concerns.
Nevertheless the foundations’ support for
research was often subtle, sometimes initiating
research in areas critical of US interests. For
instance, much of the research on what became
dependency theory in Latin America was funded
by the Ford Foundation. The independence of the
foundations from the US government enabled
them to initiate research in areas wary of US
geopolitical ambitions and bring them into US
circles of debate, by appeal to a nebulous concept
of global development free of political interest
(Arnove 1982). 
During the 1950s and 1960s, much of the
rhetoric of US commitment to international
development in Africa took place in the context
of opening up Africa to free markets and new
influences; strategies that are now referred to as
‘soft power’. Unlike in South America, there was
no previous history of US colonialism or imperial
control, with the exception of Liberia. However,
this was marred by the rapid escalation of the
Cold War, which led US geopolitical interference
to gain spheres of influence, to the Korean War,
the Vietnamese War, and support for coups
d’état throughout the world that toppled leaders
who opposed US interests.
US development programmes were initiated in
the context of the Cold War. Soviet support for
the anti-colonial struggle had won it many
friends within Africa. This led to a divide in the
bid to build African unity in the 1960s between
the Casablanca Group made up of Ghana,
Guinea, Mali, Egypt, Algeria and Morocco,
committed to radical socialist programmes and
linkages with the Soviet Union, and the
Monrovia group of more conservative states
wishing to remain within the ambit of the
colonial powers and US influence. Emperor Haile
Selassie eventually negotiated a compromise
between the two networks, resulting in the
setting up of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) headquarters in Addis Ababa. 
3 Competing interests
As a result of these competing geopolitical
interests, international development has never
been hegemonic, but always a contested site of
conflicts over knowledge and politics. While the
USA was able to shape the overriding
architecture of international development, many
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African countries had technical cadres trained in
the Soviet Union, eastern Europe and China, and
implemented mixed development plans
combining elements of state planning,
cooperatives and state farms, with US models of
rural development, community development and
the land grant system of agricultural extension. 
Many of the more radical African governments
attempted to steer a more autonomous course,
becoming members of the Non-Aligned
Movement, which itself originally arose as an
initiative of Yugoslavia, following its
disagreements with the Soviet Union. The main
advocates of the Non-Aligned Movement in the
early 1960s included presidents Tito of
Yugoslavia, Nasser of Egypt, Nkrumah of Ghana,
Sukarno of Indonesia, and Nehru, the prime
minister of India. The main principles included
respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty,
mutual non-aggression, non-interference in the
domestic affairs of other states, relations based
on equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful
coexistence. Many of the principles were initially
developed in the context of early diplomatic
relations between China and India, and China
has continued to build upon these principles in
its dealing with developing countries. Many of
these values are therefore echoed in the
articulation of principles for South–South
relations in current discourse. 
During the 1970s, many African governments
became disillusioned with international
development and sought alternative visions
(Arrighi 2002). During this era dependency
theory was in vogue. The Non-Aligned Movement
was instrumental in launching the Declaration
for the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order (NIEO), which was adopted by
the UN General Assembly in 1974. The NIEO
was a forum for promoting dialogue on
restructuring unequal trade relations between
developed and developing countries. However,
with the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the end of
the Cold War, combined with the hegemony of
the USA in international relations, the influence
of the Non-Aligned Movement and the NIEO has
declined. Nevertheless, these principles continue
to influence the rhetoric of South–South
cooperation, although it occurs in contexts that
are quite different from the original conception
of North–South unequal relations and Southern
solidarity based on self-sufficiency.
Ultimately, the world economic recession of the
1970s resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Bloc
and the bankruptcy of many African nations
which were forced to apply to the IMF for
support. With the decline of a bipolar world
competing for spheres of influence, African states
were forced to implement a set of conditionalities
made up of austerity macro-policy measures and
neoliberal reforms that opened up the economies
to global market forces, and ‘good governance’
institutional reforms. 
This period had a major impact on African
agriculture and continues to influence the
trajectories of development efforts. Within
Western international development circles, the
crises being faced by African governments were
constructed as the result of internal constraints –
bad policies that undermined agricultural
production. According to Bates (1981), African
governments used the powerful instruments of
state control and trade monopsonies to benefit a
narrow circle of urban elites and party
functionaries at the expense of farmers. The
neoliberal ‘solution’ was to dismantle state
control over the agricultural sector and enable
farmers to take advantage of market
opportunities. This thesis was elaborated by the
World Bank into a theory of ‘good governance’
(World Bank 1989). In spite of the
implementation of reform processes, African
economies continued to lag behind during the
1980s and 1990s as an increasing differentiation
began to appear within the former colonies, with
rapid rates of growth in some Southeast Asian
economies, while the GNP of African states
declined an average of 5 per cent between 1960
and 1975 and 47 per cent between 1960 and 1999
(Arrighi 2002). 
4 Economic crises, reform agendas and the
struggle over resources
Arrighi (2002) argues that the world economic
crisis of the 1970s resulted in a crisis of
profitability that intensified global competition.
The USA responded to this crisis by competing
aggressively for capital worldwide to finance a
growing trade and current account deficit on its
own balance of payments, which resulted in an
increase in interest rates everywhere and major
reversals in the direction of global capital flows.
In the period 1965–9, the US balance of
payments recorded a surplus of US$12 billion.
By 1975–9 this had turned into a deficit of
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US$7.4 billion and escalated to US$912.4 billion
in 1995–9 (Arrighi 2002, based on IMF figures).
By 2005 the USA was running a deficit of
US$700 billion, but receiving credits of US$900
billion as foreigners bought up government
bonds and mortgage bonds (Roberts 2009). This
enabled the USA to create an expanding demand
for imports controlled by US manufacturers of
products they no longer found profitable to
manufacture in the USA, but which could be
commissioned or produced by US companies by
relocating manufacturing plants elsewhere.
Harvey (2005: 93) suggests that: 
The real secret of the US success, however,
was that it was now able to pump high rates of
return into the country from its financial and
corporate operations (both direct and
portfolio investments) in the rest of the world.
It was now the flow of tribute from the rest of
the world that founded much of the affluence
achieved by the US in the 1990s. 
Arrighi (2002) argues that these developments
resulted in the rising expansion of wealth in the
USA and the bifurcation of fortunes within the
developing world. On the one hand, countries
with large pools of cheap labour and dynamic
entrepreneurial networks (largely in Southeast
Asia) were able to take advantage of these
developments to participate in manufacturing
for export markets. On the other hand, those
that had largely depended upon export of natural
resources and state organisation of
manufacturing sector enterprises suffered from
the downturn in primary commodity prices
during the 1980s, lack of capital markets and
high costs of borrowing, and their lack of large
supplies of industrial labour. As a consequence,
while east Asian nations were able to mobilise
labour supply for capital accumulation within
manufacturing, the economies of sub-Saharan
Africa sharply contracted and were forced to
accept structural adjustment programmes. 
Adherence to structural adjustment programmes
was not associated with an improvement but
with a further deterioration in the economic
performance of African states during the 1990s
(Arrighi 2002). It was not until the 2000s that
growth rates began to improve in sub-Saharan
Africa to an average of 5 per cent, in the context
of the rise in commodity prices as a result of
increasing world demand fuelled by the
industrialisation of newly emergent nations. The
economic recession in Europe and North
America, linked to a financial and mortgaging
crisis, and a crisis of profitability and faltering
economic growth has resulted in new financial
investments in Africa, particularly in the
petroleum, mining, natural resource and
agricultural sectors. Africa is now perceived to be
a continent favourable to investment with
returns on investment higher than in any other
developing region, and a rapid growth of middle-
class consumers and discretionary income
(McKinsey Global Institute 2010).
Following the 2006–08 world food crisis there has
been increasing interest in investment in
agriculture in Africa and in the development of
agriculture. This includes staple food production
for the domestic market and for exports, and
debates about the relative merits of supporting
large-scale or small-scale agriculture linked into
agri-business food chains through contractual
relations. Prior to this, there had been some
development in new horticultural exports in
Africa complementing traditional export
commodities, within a food value chain
governance system determined by supermarket
chains, brand manufacturers, and governments,
based on notions of certification (such as
EuroGap and Global Gap), standards, quality
control and systems of tracking produce to their
original points of production. US and European
investments in the agricultural sector during the
1990s and 2000s had often been less than
enthusiastic, demanding institutional and
governance reform, land tenure reform,
privatisation and government investment in
infrastructure as a precondition to investment.
For instance, the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC) requires governments to
meet 17 different ‘independent’ and
‘transparent’ policy requirements to be eligible
for support. US investors have often chosen to
invest in regions other than Africa, and
promising innovations in agricultural production
have often suffered from intensified competition
from other regions. Nevertheless, recent
initiatives such as the creation of an Alliance for
Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) under the
auspices of the Gates Foundation, the support of
the MCC for agricultural development, and the
Millennium Villages Project reflect a renewed
interest in agriculture and agricultural
commercialisation within Africa.
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5 The rising powers in Africa
In recent years new investors have rapidly moved
into the African market, including China and
Brazil. Between 2000 and 2008 China’s trade
with Africa grew by 33.5 per cent and in 2009
China overtook the USA as Africa’s largest
trading partner with the value of trade reaching
over US$160 billion in 2011 (Africa Research
Institute 2012). Although much smaller,
Brazilian trade with Africa has also grown by
400 per cent between 2002 and 2010, when it
reached US$20.6 million.
5.1 China in Africa
The rapid expansion of the Chinese economy
and manufacturing has led to an increasing
dependence of China on exports and on the US
market. Exports of goods and services in China
account for over 40 per cent of GDP, and a large
percentage of these are destined for the US
market. However, the economic downturn in the
USA and the possibility of a trade war between
the USA and China, as the USA aggressively
seeks to regenerate its manufacturing base, has
created much consternation in China about its
dependence on US markets. This has led to
attempts to diversify Chinese trade and
stimulate domestic demands. The rapid
expansion of the Chinese economy has created
demands for raw materials, energy, and food.
China has increasingly looked for new markets in
Africa to meet these demands. This has led to a
rapid expansion of trade and investment with
African countries, in which China is rapidly
emerging as a dominant trading partner in
Africa. Chinese interests in Africa are reflected
in intergovernmental cooperation, government-
sponsored projects, investments by state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) and private enterprises, the
large volume of trade manufacturers carried by
both African and Chinese traders, and the
movement of Chinese labour and small-scale
investors and traders into Africa. 
Although much of the growth in China has been
stimulated by neoliberal reforms and the
opening of new markets, this has been
implemented outside of the tenets of
neoliberalism and governance reforms.
Moreover, many of the reforms that have been
foisted onto Southeast Asian nations by the US
and international multilateral organisations, in
the wake of the Asian crisis, have been
problematic. Those nations that have fared best
have been those that have resisted further
opening of their economies and retrenchment of
the state (Harvey 2005; Stiglitz 2002; Bullard
and Bello 1998). Within Southeast Asia, the
Chinese government has been instrumental in
fostering a critical multilateral appraisal of
neoliberal reforms and promoting South–South
dialogue (Wu and Lansdowne 2008). 
This notion of South–South cooperation has also
been extended into diplomatic, technical and
development cooperation relations with African
nations. China has sought to develop the Forum
on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), an
intergovernmental forum through which various
high-level Chinese and African leaders meet to
define the parameters and scope of Chinese and
African developmental ties (Buckley, this IDS
Bulletin). The China–Africa Development Fund
(CADFund) has opened four regional offices on
the African continent and provides funding for
projects within Africa and a bridge to encourage
and facilitate investments of Chinese companies
within Africa. The main areas of technical
cooperation and investment are concerned with
infrastructure development, communications,
construction, dam and energy production, natural
resource sectors, petroleum, mining and
agriculture. China has established over 40
agricultural demonstration centres in African
countries. It provides agricultural assistance that
combines infrastructural development, such as in
dam construction with technical training, input
provisioning and storage facilities, and facilitating
linkages between agricultural ministries and
communities. With funding of US$1 billion in its
first phase and US$2 billion in its second phase,
the CADFund has made significant contributions
to foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa. 
Although China’s presence in Africa has
expanded in recent years, China has a long
history of development cooperation within Africa
from the 1960s. During the 1980s Chinese
development assistance to Africa increased with
numerous development projects in many
countries. The Chinese economy has considerably
expanded and transformed in recent years, and
the level and nature of Chinese investments in
Africa have rapidly expanded. However, China’s
recent expansion in Africa has been preceded by
a long history and experience of diplomatic and
technical cooperation linkages, and participation
in several multilateral forums (Guttal 2008).
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5.2 Brazil in Africa
In contrast with China, Brazil is a relatively new
player in Africa. Its policy of promoting
South–South cooperation grows out of its regional
policy in South America. Its movement into
development in Africa is very recent, originating
from the mid-2000s, with the visit of President
Lula to 26 African countries in the early 2000s,
the expansion of embassies with African
countries, the organisation of the Brazil–Africa
Forum, and the setting up of technical
cooperation programmes, credits, and joint
Chambers of Commerce for African countries
(Cabral et al., this IDS Bulletin; Pierri, this IDS
Bulletin; Patriota and Pierri 2013). As with China,
Brazil has been suspicious of multilateral and US
neoliberal reform prescriptions in the wake of the
Mexican and Argentinean crises, and has
propounded a development framework built on
South–South cooperation. 
This is reflected in a diverse portfolio of export
partners in which 55 per cent of the value of
exports are with Latin America, 15 per cent
North America, 6 per cent Central America,
8 per cent Europe, 7 per cent Asia and 5 per cent
with Africa (Aulakh 2006: 100). In contrast with
China, Brazil has oriented its exports much
more toward South American markets rather
than the USA. Within South America, Brazil has
been instrumental in opposing attempts to set up
the Free Trade Area of the Americas, without the
conditional elimination of US agricultural
subsidies, measures to ensure access to US
markets, and changes to US policy on patents.
Brazil has actively supported the development of
Mercorsur, a common market or free trade zone
whose full members include Brazil, Argentina,
Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela, and has
become a strong advocate of South–South
cooperation as a central tenet of its development
policy based on economic cooperation between
South American and African nations. 
This notion is based on establishing joint
economic investments to promote technical
cooperation. Like Chinese notions of
South–South cooperation, this is based on non-
interference, no preconditions attached to aid,
and symmetric relations in which technical
cooperation develops out of expressed mutual
interests. The Brazilian framework of
South–South cooperation in Africa stresses the
similarities of the Brazilian and African
environments, the recent technical and research
successes that Brazil has achieved in this
environment, and the transferability of these
technologies to Africa (Cabral and Shankland
2013; World Bank and IPEA 2011).
Brazilian South–South cooperation also stresses
its commitment to social inclusion and the
eradication of poverty and the successes that it
has achieved in implementing its Bolsa Família
(family allowance) programme, which targets the
poor for family assistance and provides conditional
financial support and school feeding programmes
to ensure that the children of the poor attend
school (Patriota and Pierri 2013; Pierri, this IDS
Bulletin; World Bank and IPEA 2011; McCann
2008). In 2005, the Brazilian government through
its Ministry of Social Development (MDS) began
disseminating the precepts of the Bolsa Família or
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programme, as
it came to be known internationally, to South
Africa, Nigeria and the UK Department for
International Development (DFID). In 2006,
delegates from Ghana, Guinea Bissau,
Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia
made a study tour to Brazil. In 2007, the
Ghanaian government implemented a version of
the Bolsa Família known as the Livelihood
Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP)
programme, and Benin is currently implementing
a version (Stolte 2012). In 2008, the MDS, in
collaboration with DFID and the International
Poverty Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG),
launched the Africa–Brazil Cooperation
Programme on Social Development, based on
technical cooperation, study tours, and distance
learning. The Bolsa Família has grown into a
trilateral programme, with both DFID and the
World Bank supporting its dissemination in Africa
(World Bank and IPEA 2011; Lindert 2006). 
The Brazilian government has also signed a
cooperation agreement with the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) to extend its
Zero Hunger programme to Africa. This works
through expanding public procurement of food
produced by smallholders for school feeding
programmes and by supporting family farm
production through the More Food programme.
The More Food programme in Brazil seeks to
raise the productivity of Brazil’s smallholder
family farms by providing them with credit under
preferential terms to acquire subsidised farm
equipment and machinery and technical
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assistance. This has resulted in a dramatic
increase in productivity of 89 per cent by area,
and of income by 30 per cent. It also creates new
markets for Brazilian agricultural technology in
which 60 per cent of Brazil’s tractor sales and
41 per cent of its agricultural machinery
workforce derived from the More Food
programme (Patriota and Pierri 2013; Cabral et
al., this IDS Bulletin). Five African countries have
currently signed agreements for the extension of
this programme into their rural settings –
Ghana, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Kenya and
Mozambique. The expansion of this programme
into Africa seeks to enhance rural food security,
increase productivity, address technology
capacity issues, and create an expanded market
for Brazilian technology. However, whether the
Africa More Food programme will create
technologies for small and medium farmers or
lead to the provision of subsidised technologies
for rich farmers remains to be seen in the
implementation of the programme. Within the
African agrarian economy, smallholders cultivate
much smaller areas than would make tractor
ownership economically viable. 
South–South cooperation has formed a major
framework in which Brazil has rapidly expanded
its investments in Africa during the 2000s, in
construction, energy, public health, agriculture,
and social protection. In building South–South
cooperation in Africa, Brazil tends to stress its
cultural similarities with Africa, the existence of
a large African diaspora in Brazil, the existence
of communities within West Africa that
repatriated from Brazil in the nineteenth
century, and the similarity of the African physical
environment with that of Brazil. However,
cultural ties remain poorly developed and
superficial, with few student and tourist cultural
exchanges taking place, nor joint social studies
research programmes being undertaken. Outside
of the former Portuguese colonies there are also
language barriers to communication.
Brazil has pursued a policy of opening up the
economy to international market forces and
investments and privatising SOEs following the
1982 Latin American debt crisis. However, state
regulations and support for local capital has
enabled the rapid emergence of Brazilian
multinational companies, particularly dealing
with natural resources, energy, construction and
agri-business. Many of these companies have
expanded into regional South American markets
and are now moving into Africa (Schneider 2009). 
Agriculture accounts for three quarters of
commodity exports, the major products including
soy, sugar and ethanol, chicken, beef, coffee
tobacco, and orange juice. Brazil is the fourth
largest agricultural exporter in the world, and
many of its agri-business firms are now
establishing plants in foreign countries. The
largest agri-business companies are in meat
processing. The three major meat processors and
exporters are JBS – which became the largest
beef processor in the world in 2007 following a
number of aggressive takeovers, and had
revenues of over US$7 billion in that year – and
Sadia and Perdigão, which in 2008 both had
revenues of nearly US$5 billion. Sadia also
specialises in processed and frozen foods and
Perdigão in dairy products (Schneider 2009).
Ethanol is a major product, originating in
attempts to create energy self-sufficiency during
the period of import substitution. In contrast with
China, Brazilian companies tend to depend upon
employing local staff rather than Brazilians, and
Brazilian economic interests are marked less by
movements of Brazilians into Africa. Brazilian
companies in Africa tend to be a select few large
private sector companies rather than the mix of
SOEs and mixed scale of private companies that
characterise Chinese investments in Africa.
However, communications between Brazil and
sub-Saharan Africa remain poor with no direct
flights, except to South Africa.
6 Conclusion
Although South–South cooperation appears to be
a recent concept in international development
cooperation, it is the culmination of longer
historical processes, and is rooted in a particular
historical political economy. It reflects a
particular trajectory of development in which
import substitution industrialisation was
replaced by export-oriented growth, but one in
which the successful rising powers have been
able to protect and nurture their own industries
and make them competitive within a global
economy. While the emerging powers have
introduced forms of economic restructuring that
have been shaped by the global economy and
market liberalism, the state has played a major
role in protecting and nurturing the growth of
national capital and in creating an enabling
environment for the growth of both national
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capital and international investments by national
industries. This has facilitated the emergence of
increasing economic efficiency and companies
that can compete successfully within a global
economy. 
Although these economic reforms have resulted
in the adoption of market liberalisation, this has
also been combined with a resistance to and
critique of some of the policies advocated by the
US and multilateral organisations, which has
been carried by China into Asian regional forums
and by Brazil into South American regional
forums. South–South cooperation in Africa
reflects a further extension of this critique into
increasing competition for resources and markets
with Western transnational companies (Amanor,
this IDS Bulletin). South–South cooperation
critiques the conditionalities that Western
nations have attempted to impose on Africa,
Southeast Asia and South America, and develops
an alternative framework of technical assistance
based on non-intervention, respect for national
sovereignty and national interests. Western
conditionalities are seen by both the Chinese and
Brazilian governments and policymakers as
imposing policies on Africa that do not
necessarily meet African needs, which need to be
defined by African governments and their people.
The framework of South–South cooperation
draws upon earlier frameworks of a new
international economic order and non-alignment,
although these are now framed within the
concept of a market-driven economy.
South–South cooperation now reflects an
economic order based on private and public
sector partnerships that responds to the market
and is willing to make large investments within
African countries, and make provisions for
infrastructural development to facilitate the
emergence of a modern economy. It extends the
competition between US multinational
companies and the new multinational agri-
business companies that have emerged in East
Asia and Brazil onto the African continent. While
US companies neglected Africa to invest in these
new emergent economies, which were considered
to have more potential, the companies that have
emerged in these areas now see Africa as the new
frontier for investment. This opens up African
economies to rapid investment, and transforms
Africa from a marginalised entity of exception
into a frontier for future industrial and agri-
industrial potential. 
In contrast with Western donors, these new
interventions set up a synergy between
infrastructure development, technical
cooperation and capital accumulation, which
creates new demands and markets. They do not
make capital investment conditional upon the
creation of an enabling environment. Rather
than focusing on institutional reform as a
precondition for investment, they set up a
process of transformation and capital
accumulation that generates the material
conditions for institutional change. South–South
cooperation sets up a framework of diplomatic
ties to facilitate trade, based on notions of
symmetric exchange (soft power), and the
building of intergovernmental fora to facilitate
investments and business exchange. It facilitates
change pragmatically based on existing
economic opportunities and interests in
investment and accumulation. It does not
attempt to pre-define and manage change by
moralising about the nature of change. 
Yet in many respects these new developments
have only been made possible by earlier
interventions by Western powers, and must be
seen in this historical context. These include the
neoliberal economic conditionalities that opened
up African economies to external investment,
and the institutional and governance reforms
that came with them. In the agricultural context,
the earlier investments in training and
professional development – consolidated within
the UN and CGIAR systems – have also
substantially contributed towards the
development of science, technology and
investment within the rising powers. It is very
often these same people who are part of new
South–South engagements in Africa. Although
this long-running development support by
Western states in some senses competes with
Western capital, these new networks also embody
alliances with fractions of Northern capital,
helping to open up new markets within Africa
and international markets for African products
within new alliances, now framed by
South–South or triangular cooperation (Amanor,
this IDS Bulletin). 
Thus, while frequently framed as new, different
and path-breaking, we must always recognise how
South–South cooperation builds upon pre-
existing forms of international development,
neoliberal policy frameworks and the expansion
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of capital in Africa. It of course adds new
perspectives, actors and networks, including
important notions of social inclusion based on a
mixture of market and state interventions. Yet,
given the weight of historical conditioning factors
and the context set by market-based reforms,
both in Africa but also in the emerging powers,
we must question the extent to which alternative,
new paradigms for development cooperation can
really be created within this neoliberal
institutional framework, as development, from
whatever source, acts to facilitate capital
accumulation and new forms of market
socialisation. While reconfiguring relations,
introducing new actors and adding new discursive
frames, South–South cooperation must therefore
be understood in its historical, political economic
context, and in relation to the particular, diverse,
and often contradictory, interests of states and
capital in African agriculture. 
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